Introduction
A recent trend in the neuroscientific and philosophical literature suggests that we have representations that are shared between self and others. It all started in 1992 when researchers in Parma found that the same neurons fired both when a monkey was grasping a peanut and when it was watching the experimenter grasping it (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1995; Grezes & Decety, 2001 ). More generally, the motor system is activated not only when an agent executes a goal-directed action, but also when an observer perceives the same action performed by another agent. What makes action mirroring special is that it goes beyond mere conceptual sharing. In Jeannerod (1994)'s terms, one does not share only semantic knowledge about the action; one shares the agent's pragmatic perspective. As such, action mirroring allows the observer to internalise another individual's actions as if she were the agent by a kind of motor simulation.
Most people have drawn the implications of those shared action representations for 3rd person mindreading (do they allow direct understanding of other people's intentions?). By contrast, Marc Jeannerod focuses his interest on their implications for selfawareness and more specifically, for the sense of agency (how do I recognise my actions as my own?). With Elisabeth Pacherie, he argues that shared motor representations consist in what they call naked intentions, that is, intentions that are neutral relative to the agent (Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004) . The naked content can take two forms: either impersonal of the type o action, goal4 or personal of the type ox, action, goal4 , with x as the parameter of the agent still to be determined (de Vignemont, 2004; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004) . In any case, the activation of shared motor representations cannot suffice to differentiate whether it is the agent moving or another person moving. Further processes based on extra information are needed: "Given the existence of shared representations, something more than the sole awareness of a naked intention is needed to determine its author" (Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004, p. 140) . The lack of differentiation between self and others seems indeed to indicate that one needs a specific mechanism to take apart one's actions and other people's actions. Georgieff and Jeannerod (1998) call this mechanism the 'Who' system.
Jeannerod analyses mirroring exclusively in motor terms, with no reference to the body that carries the action. However, it seems that in some situations, we need to establish a correspondence between the representation of our body and the representation of other people's bodies. How do we achieve such correspondence? Are there shared body representations? These questions are all the more legitimate since recent evidence indicates the existence of shared cortical networks for vicarious bodily sensations. Brain activity partially overlaps when one experiences touch or pain and when one observes another individual receiving a tactile or a painful stimulus (e.g., Singer et al., 2004; Keysers et al., 2004 
